Henry Kissinger, a former national security adviser and secretary-general under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Johnson, stated that the Vietnam War was “We shouldn’t have been there.” Soon, Americans, including politicians in the Beltway, will come to the same conclusion regarding Washington’s proxy war against Russia.
The House, Senate, and White House did not intend to make the pro-Ukraine war with Moscow a contest for “competitive social collapse” between NATO and Russia. We are here. It was impossible to imagine that the Biden administration, the bipartisan war party, would lead Americans and Europeans into an economic, political, and military valley of Death from which there is no escape. But that is precisely what is happening.
While the Ukrainian-victory narrative is a benefit of Western media actively “tuned out” opposing views, it also portrays Russia and its Armed Forces in the worst possible light. It is no surprise that Americans have been conditioned to see the worst of Russians for nearly 50 years.
There is also a degree of “true faith” in the Beltway, which believes Washington can dictate what happens in Eastern Ukraine, thousands of miles away. This message resonates in Congress because it is based on a crucial strategic assumption that American citizens have yet to challenge: that American power is unlimited and unconstrained. It’s as if a series of strategic failures, from Vietnam through Afghanistan, never took place.
American politicians tend to be more concerned with domestic matters than foreign policy. This explains why members of Congress have believed for eight years that a war with Russia would not be a high-risk matter. Ukraine would provide the cannons, while Washington would supply the weapons and ammunition.
As you can see, Washington’s governing principles remain the same from all previous U.S. interventions around the globe. You can’t help but get confused: large numbers of soldiers, in this case, Ukrainians, advised by U.S. officers and allied officers, and vast infusions of cash, equipment, and technology can permanently change strategic reality in America’s favor.
It is difficult to imagine that a U.S. secretary-of-state today would sign an international agreement in which war was not considered an instrument of U.S. policy. This is what Secretary of State Frank Kellogg did back in 1928. As Shakespeare said, “The truth will come out.”
Moscow’s decision in March to defend the territories it had seized during the first months of a war with an elastic and strategic defense directly resulted from its 700,000 Russian troops with modern equipment. This was a brilliant but unpopular decision in Russia. The strategy worked. The losses in Ukraine have been devastating, and the Russian Forces will be in a position by November to strike a decisive blow.
There are rumors today that Kyiv might be under pressure to launch additional counterattacks against Russian defenses at Kherson (Southern Ukraine) before the November midterm elections. The preservation of the Ukrainian state is not synonymous with spending what little Ukraine’s blood on the expulsion of Russian forces. It is also unlikely that additional sacrifices made by Ukrainians will help the Biden administration during the midterm elections.
Moscow’s red line regarding Ukraine’s entry into NATO was, in fact, always actual. Crimea and Eastern Ukraine were always dominated by the Russian language, culture, and history. Europe’s economic decline this winter is natural. So is Russia’s support in China and India and Moscow’s growing military power.
Congress was enthralled by lobbyists, think tanks, and retired generals with high-level knowledge in high-end conventional warfare. The House and Senate were encouraged to support dubious strategies allowing the United States to use military assistance. This included reckless scenarios for nuclear war with Russia and China. U.S. politicians seem to have lost sight of reality. Any use of atomic weapons will overwhelm all national policies.
This is not the first instance of American political leaders misjudging the nature of a situation. Kissinger advised Nixon in 1969 against de-escalation, arguing that Washington would not be able to negotiate with Hanoi if it kept its troops fighting in Vietnam. Kissinger was wrong. Washington lost nothing by giving up more Americans in Vietnam to Hanoi after January 1969.
The bleak prospects Ukraine has of ever regaining its lost territory and its declining strategic health means that Ukraine’s future rests in Russia. Washington has a practical and morally sound solution: Kyiv must stop the bloodletting and make as much peace with Moscow as possible. Washington cannot see the answer.
Washington will continue to provide cash, military aid, and equipment to Ukraine. Washington’s ruling class will also benefit from the transfer of cash to the Pentagon, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, and other Pentagon facilities. While Russia will likely grow in strength, Washington and its NATO allies won’t be able to gain any strategic value. This is a mistake Washington will regret.
